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The Know Nothings in Iowa:
Opportunity and Frustration
in Antebellum Politics
RONALD MATTHIAS
THE STORY OF KNOW NOTHINGISM is in part the story
of one of those remarkable outbursts of nativistic sentiment
that have from time to time punctuated American history. But
it is more—and less—than that. Thrusting itself into the con-
fused political arena of the mid-1850s, the Know Nothing
movement quickly demonstrated that nativism was for many
little more than a facade, behind which lurked a multitude of
interests and schemes—some praiseworthy, some reprehen-
sible, some inconsistent, some even contradictory.
Over the nation as a whole. Know Nothingism had a
tendency to mean different things to different people—and
even to the same people at different times. Ostensibly
opposed to alien influences in American life, its development
in the North was very different from its development in the
South. Even within regions, the Know Nothing appeal varied
considerably from state to state and from county to county.
When to all of this is added the Know Nothing commitment
to secrecy (at least in the early days), we begin to understand
why no serious historian has been courageous enough—or
perhaps foolhardy enough—to undertake a comprehensive
survey of the Know Nothing movement on a national scale.
And until the recent publication of Tyler Anbinder's superb
Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Pol-
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itics of the 1850s, even solid regional studies have been con-
spicuous by their absence from bibliographies on the 1850s.'
For all of its strengths, Anbinder's study pays relatively
little attention to the Know Nothings in Iowa. The Iowa story
is both fascinating and significant, in part because of what it
says about the role of the Know Nothings in the collapse of
the second American party system and the creation of the
Republican party. ^  Equally important, the experience of the
Hawkeye state helps to clarify the societal context within
which the strange career of the Know Nothings unfolded. If
we are to understand that career, we need to unravel the
seeming mystery of how and why so many Americans were
attracted so suddenly (and often so briefly) to a mid-century
political crusade against Roman Catholics and the foreign-
born.
IN IOWA, as elsewhere, the Know Nothings moved from
obscurity to prominence almost overnight. The organization
first appeared in the Hawkeye state during the summer of
1854, too late to play a significant role in the stunning victory
of James Grimes and the "Opposition" over the Democratic
party in the August election of that year. By October, a Know
Nothing state council had been organized; and, during the
next few months, a temporary stillness in the Kansas storm
permitted Iowans to turn their attention from the extension
of slavery to other issues and concerns. During the winter of
1854-55, Know Nothing organizers established local councils
throughout the state. During the same months, a number of
influential newspapers, including the Muscatine Journal and
the Davenport Gazette, joined the Know Nothing cause. In
early 1855 the Know Nothings won a series of key municipal
elections, enabling them to control four of the six most
important cities in the state: Davenport, Iowa City, Keokuk,
and Muscatine. And in April 1855, by engaging in a grand
1. Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and
the Politics of the 1850s (New York, 1992).
2. Robert R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and White Suprem-
acy on the Hawkeye Frontier (Cambridge, 1993), 129-36, provides a useful
summary and analysis of the political career of the Know Nothings in
Iowa. See also Dykstra's article in this issue.
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fusion with nearly every non-Democratic faction in Iowa,
they were able to elect all three of their candidates for state
office. In less than a year the Know Nothings had become a
power in Iowa politics. One can scarcely blame them for
expecting additional successes in the months and years to
come.^
The party's expectations were quickly placed in jeopardy,
however, by the consequences of popular sovereignty in Kan-
sas. As news of lawlessness and disorder on the Kansas
plains made its way into the columns of the Iowa press dur-
ing the spring of 1855, the slavery issue once again became
the focal point of public discussion. Fears of papal conquest
and foreign influence, if not forgotten, suddenly seemed far
less important than they had a few months earlier. Com-
pounding the problem for Iowa Know Nothings was the
adoption of an essentially proslavery platform by the national
council of the party in June 1855.
As antislavery sentiment spread rapidly in Iowa, a new
competitor confronted the Know Nothings. "Republicans"
called conventions in a number of counties during the sum-
mer of 1855. In some cases Know Nothings figured promi-
nently in the proceedings. When returns from the August
county elections of that year demonstrated an evaporation of
Know Nothing strength over much of the state, the Know
Nothing press, apparently sensing the direction the political
winds were blowing, swung suddenly to the support of a
campaign to organize a Republican party in Iowa. In the
months that followed, the same sentiment infiltrated the
ranks of the Know Nothing organization. Those who had an
investment in that organization and who still looked to it for
political success were consequently reduced to two alterna-
tives: forestall the Republican movement, or fuse with it.
The first alternative was, from the standpoint of most
Know Nothings, clearly preferable. But was it feasible? Con-
ceivably it was. If the Know Nothing party of Iowa were to
adopt as its own an essentially Republican platform, it might
3. This and the following paragraphs summarize or, in some cases, are
taken directly from my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Know Nothing Movement
in Iowa" (University of Chicago, 1965).
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retain, or secure, the support of most of those in the state
who opposed the extension of slavery. Consequently, in
November 1855 the Know Nothing state council drew up a
platform concentrating almost exclusively on the slavery
issue. But it failed to stall the Republican drive. The Know
Nothings quickly discovered that the Republicans already
held most of the trump cards in the antislavery game. Repub-
lican recruiting continued to decimate Know Nothing ranks.
The Republican position on slavery was clearly popular not
only in Iowa, but throughout the North. And the Republicans
could hope to draw support from a quarter the Know Noth-
ings could never touch—the "foreign vote."
Under the circumstances, the Know Nothings' best alter-
native was fusion with the Republicans for the 1856 cam-
paign. Fusion was accomplished, but on Republican terms,
and under Republican auspices, when the first Iowa Republi-
can state convention on February 22, 1856, nominated for
state office four candidates, three of whom possessed solid
Know Nothing connections. Once again, faithful Know Noth-
ings faced two unpalatable alternatives: either support the
Republican nominees, or place a second slate of Know Noth-
ing nominees in the field—a choice, in short, between politi-
cal oblivion and political impotency.
Most antislavery Know Nothings chose the first alterna-
tive. But there were more than a few nativists in Iowa who
did not share the antislavery predilections of the majority.
Managing to secure control of a lightly attended American
party (that is. Know Nothing) state convention in March
1856, they repeated the Republican nominations for state
office. By nominating a separate slate of presidential electors
pledged to support American candidate Millard Fillmore,
however, they signaled their determination to keep an Ameri-
can party in the field.
Following that convention, no further effort was made to
maintain the state organization. Surviving antislavery Know
Nothings gradually drifted into the ranks of the Republican
party. A number of so-called National Know Nothings, who
opposed the Republican position on slavery in the territories
and who saw in the American organization a means of avoid-
ing sectional conflict, continued to maintain orgarüzations on a
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county or township basis—particularly in extreme southern
Iowa. But they enjoyed no political success. In the August
1856 elections American party candidates throughout the state
were shut out at the polls—in most cases by humiliating mar-
gins. Fillmore's fate in November was equally unhappy.
Receiving only 10 percent of the Iowa vote, he carried not a
single county in the state. What little support he had came not
so much because of his connection with nativism, but rather
because of his appeal as a national, conservative candidate.
A brief effort to revive the American organization in
1857 was marked only by ignominious failure; never again
did any candidate for political office in Iowa run as a Know
Nothing. On the other hand, charges of Know Nothing
ancestry and nativism did continue to spice Iowa politics until
the eve of the Civil War.
KNOW NOTHING SUCCESSES in Iowa, limited and tran-
sitory though they were, deserve explanation. How could a
party that based its appeal to the electorate on proscriptive
principles attract such an extensive following—even tempo-
rarily? Any answer to this question ought to involve not only
a listing of the attractions of Know Nothingism, but also
some attempt to assess their comparative importance.
Whatever else the Know Nothing movement in Iowa
may have represented, it was not an indigenous explosion of
latent hostilities toward Roman Catholicism. This is not, of
course, the same as saying that Iowans were free from anti-
Catholic prejudice. They, like the overwhelming majority of
their compatriots, grew up in a society that fostered a tradi-
tion of fear and hostility toward the Church of Rome.
Although many American institutions contributed to the
maintenance of this tradition, it received constant nourish-
ment from a large portion of the Protestant clergy in Iowa,
particularly representatives of the American Home Mission-
ary Society, whose quarterly reports to the society regularly
reflected an intense fear and hatred of Catholicism.^ But a
4. American Home Missionary Society Correspondence, State Historical
Society of Iowa, Des Moines; Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in
Iowa," 45-49.
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strong tradition of open hostility to Catholicism never took
root in Iowa before the appearance of the Know Nothings in
1854. Many Iowans may have distrusted Roman Catholics;
and they may have preferred, other things being equal, not to
live in the shadow of a Catholic church. Certainly they were
no more immune than other Americans to the influences of a
pervasive American tradition' of anti-Catholicism. But these
same Iowans were concerned about what must have seemed
to them more important matters.
Iowa was a youthful state—full of promise, but as yet
quite undeveloped. What the state needed more than any-
thing else was people—people with (as they put it) "strong
arms and resolute hearts." Every newcomer to Iowa was both
a potential and an actual source of wealth for the state. But
"strong arms and resolute hearts" were not the exclusive pos-
session of Protestants. Roman Catholics possessed them, too.
Consequently, when Bishop Mathias Loras of Iowa made
strenuous efforts to attract to the Hawkeye state Catholic set-
tlers from Europe and the eastern seaboard states, few
Iowans objected. Loras himself testified to the willingness of
pioneer Iowans to put pocketbook before prejudice when he
reported that Protestants in the infant town of Bellevue were
eager to have a Catholic church there in order to attract set-
tlers and thereby increase the value of their landed invest-
ments. And in 1844 Loras described Dubuque as "the most
quiet place in America. Protestants are not bigoted here, they
respect us, and will never threaten to assassinate the poor
Bishop."5
Another reason anti-Catholicism failed to develop strong
roots in Iowa was the Roman Catholic Church's obvious ina-
bility to achieve a significant measure of power and influence
in the state. If Rome had marked out Iowa for conquest, as
the early American Home Missionary Society missionaries
believed, that conquest signally failed to materialize. Despite
5. M. M. Hoffmann, "The Roman Catholic Church in Iowa," Palimpsest 34
(1953), 352-53; Loras, quoted in John F. Kempker, History of the Catholic
Church in Iowa (Iowa City, 1887), 37; and in M. M. Hoffmann, The Church
Founders of the Northwest: loras and Cretin and Other Captains of Christ
(Milwaukee, 1937), 181.
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Bishop Loras's efforts to attract Catholic settlers, there were
by 1854 only fifteen thousand Roman Catholics in the state,
less than 5 per cent of the total population.^ As a result, the
Catholic Church was hardly in a position to invite trouble by
appearing arrogant. At the same time, other Iowans could
afford to be tolerant of so small a minority. Despite constant
underlying tension and a few minor outbursts, conflict
between Catholics and non-Catholics was muted. Iowa was
not marching in the ranks of the "Protestant Crusade" before
1854.
In July of that year the Dubuque Observer did launch a
vitriolic editorial campaign of abuse against Roman Catholi-
cism. In succeeding months, other members of the Iowa press
joined that campaign.^ But, for the most part, open expres-
sions of anti-Catholicism developed after rather than before
the appearance of the Know Nothing movement in the state.
Furthermore, most of the complaints leveled against Catholics
merely repeated charges that had been making the rounds in
the East for some time. Few applied directly or uniquely to
Iowa. The campaign against Catholicism in late 1854, then,
was more effect than cause—a justification for the existence
of Know Nothingism, not its source.
Know Nothingism was not able to sustain itself during
its brief career in Iowa by feeding upon an established tradi-
tion of virulent anti-Catholicism. Would its prospects for
nourishment have been any better if it had concentrated on
the alleged threat to American institutions arising from the
existence of a considerable immigrant population within the
state? Was there deeper antipathy toward the foreign-born
than toward the Roman Catholic, and if so, could the Know
Nothings have capitalized upon it?
The earliest white settlers of the territory and state of
Iowa were largely native-born Americans, many of southern
stock. From the very beginning of settlement they were
joined by a lesser number of people who had begun their
journey to Iowa in some foreign land, most often Germany or
6. Kempker, History of the Catholic Church in Iowa, 40-41.
7. Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in Iowa," 4-16.
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Ireland. By 1856 roughly one Iowan in seven listed another
country as place of nativity.^
The existence of this substantial foreign-born population
in Iowa created an opportunity for the development of con-
crete ethnic tension. Occasional notes of nativistic hostility
were struck, but usually in direct response to allegedly unde-
sirable behavior on the part of the foreign-born. Both Ger-
man and Irish voters, during the 1840s and early 1850s, were
staunch supporters of the Democratic party. The Whigs,
invariably on the losing side in elections, consequently com-
plained from time to time about the "foreign vote." But during
the course of election campaigns, the Whigs, seeking to woo
this vote, were as full of praise of naturalized voters as were
the Democrats.^
Cultural differences could be potential sources of con-
flict. For example, the disdainful attitude of some Germans—
particularly Forty-eighters—toward religion and community
moral standards was one source of irritation. Theodor Gülicb,
editor of the German-language Davenport Demokrat, created
a considerable stir in 1853 by suggesting that Americans get
rid of "the obsolete idea that ours ought to be a Christian
country." Iowans also complained from time to time about the
failure of the foreign-born to show proper respect for that
venerable American institution—the sober Sabbath. Ger-
mans, in particular, were fond of Sunday ballroom activities,
which most Iowans regarded as a desecration of the Lord's
Day. Beyond this, both the Germans and the Irish persistently
opposed having their drinking habits regulated by law—at
the very time when the crusade for a Maine Law was reach-
ing a crescendo in Iowa. Obviously, it was not difficult for
"native" Iowans to find fault with the foreign-born, particu-
larly, because of their prominence, the Germans and Irish.
And there was almost constant tension between the Ameri-
can and immigrant communities in parts of early
8. John A. T. Hull, comp., Iowa Historical and Comparative Census, 1836-
1880 (Des Moines, 1883), 168-69.
9. Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in Iowa," 64.
10. Davenport Gazette, 25 August 1853; Matthias, "The Know Nothing
Movement in Iowa," 67-76.
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But the tension, insofar as it did exist, seldom ap-
proached the breaking point. On the contrary, most Iowans
found the foreign-born to be, on balance, far more desirable
than undesirable. In the Iowa press, praise outweighed com-
plaint by an overwhelming margin. Some of the enthusiasm
was undoubtedly little more than an expression of frontier
boosterism. On the other hand, many editorials reflected a
faith in America's mission to serve as a haven for the op-
pressed and less fortunate of every land. Others suggested
that the foreign-born, having demonstrated their love for lib-
erty by emigrating to this country, would infuse new strength
into American democracy."
The case for the foreign-born, however, was most fre-
quently based on economic considerations. The Davenport
Gazette spoke for many Iowans when it said in 1854,
"Though immigration is large, we would not impede it. We
apprehend no bad consequences from its extent. The diffi-
culty is not that we have too many laborers, but too few.
How could our canals and railroads have been built without
the strong Irish and German immigrants? How would our
new States and Territories have been settled, and their wil-
derness made to blossom like the rose, had there been less
encouragement for aliens to flock thither and become citi-
zens?"^ ^  In other words, immigration was wealth; immigrants
were indispensable to the economy of a frontier state. This
fact of life came to be generally recognized during territorial
and early statehood years in Iowa, and, as a result, helped
prevent serious ethnic conflict.
Thus, few Iowans were ready to embark on a nativistic
crusade before the Know Nothing party made its appearance
in the state. Once organized, of course, the party could draw
on a reservoir of ill will that had been generated in past
months and years. But most of the complaints of Iowa Know
Nothings against the foreign-born, after the organization of
the party, applied more to the situation in eastern states than
in Iowa. The same general charges were repeated time after
time until they began to read like a political catechism. Rarely
11. Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in Iowa," 65-66.
12. Davenport Gazette, 15 June 1854.
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was there any indication that, with respect to the foreign-
born, the local situation demanded the existence of organized
nativism. Given the general conditions of the mid-1850s,
Know Nothingism might well have thrust itself upon the
Iowa scene with nearly the same success had there been not a
single immigrant—or, for that matter, a single Roman
Catholic—in the state.
One possibly serious objection to this conclusion de-
serves consideration. The year in which the Know Nothing
party was established in Iowa was also a year of intense tem-
perance agitation. Most of the foreign-born could fairly be
charged with unalterable opposition to having their drinking
habits regulated by legislative enactment. At the same time,
those Iowans who enlisted in the ranks of Know Nothingism
were almost unanimously staunch supporters of such legisla-
tion. ^ ^ Is it possible, then, that the Iowa Know Nothing party
was primarily an anti-liquor response to the alleged fondness
of the Germans for "lager bier" and the Irish for whiskey?
A high degree of correlation between Know Nothingism
and temperance sentiment might be expected if the former
had become the political vehicle for the latter. But it did not.
Prominent temperance advocates, such as James Thorington
and Hiram Price, supported the Know Nothing movement,
but a host of others seem never to have done so. In fact. Rev.
Henry Clay Dean, an untiring Methodist spokesman for the
prohibitory cause, was the most brilliant and articulate of all
Iowa critics of Know Nothingism.^*
There is also the matter of timing. The Know Nothing
party developed in Iowa after the August 1854 election—an
election in which the people of the state had chosen in James
Grimes a governor friendly to the prohibitory cause, and a
legislature that would probably enact its demands. A Know
Nothing party almost certainly would have supported the
cause, but it is hard to understand how any politically
13. An analysis of biographical data on the leaders of the Know Nothing
movement in Iowa reveals virtually nothing—except solid support for leg-
islated temperance—that would clearly distinguish them from their politi-
cal opponents.
14. Matthias, "The Know Nothing Movement in Iowa," 18-20.
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minded Iowan at the time could have felt it necessary to cre-
ate a new political party for the purpose of remedying the
evils of intemperance. The Hawkeye state was well on its way
toward legislated temperance—with or without a Know
Nothing presence.
Neither the enactment of a prohibitory law by the legis-
lature in late 1854 nor the ratification of that law by the peo-
ple in April 1855 made the Know Nothing party superfluous.
Know Nothing strength did begin to wane during the second
quarter of 1855, possibly due in part to the departure of tem-
perance men who had got what they wanted. But if some of
these men abandoned the nativist cause for that reason (and
there is little evidence that they did), most of them did not.
The affinity between temperance enthusiasts and Know
Nothingism lay much deeper than a mere conscious desire to
strike at the enemies of legislated morality.
Hostility toward Catholics and the foreign-born was not
fundamental in generating the Know Nothing movement in
Iowa. Subsequent Know Nothing rhetoric did, of course,
express such hostility, but for most Iowa Know Nothings that
rhetoric was more a matter of rationalization than of ration-
ale. Know Nothingism was a kind of political magpie's nest
created out of an unusual assortment of interests and con-
cerns. Some of the interests were noticeably remote from
genuine fear of alien influence, but all stood to benefit from
participation in a nativistic crusade.
INITIALLY, the Know Nothing movement in Iowa was not
the consequence of an outburst of mass sentiment; it was
instead the calculated creation of politicians, many of whom
seem to have been far more concerned with political gain
than they were with the ideology of nativism. The Iowa polit-
ical situation in 1854 almost demanded the formation of a
new political organization. The once potent Whig party had
fallen upon hard times, and was precariously close to breath-
ing its last, despite the victory of James W. Grimes in the
gubernatorial contest of 1854. The Iowa Democracy was in
considerably better health than were the Whigs, but it too
had more than its share of political ailments. Rent by faction-
alism, divided over temperance, almost torn asunder by the
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impact of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the party could no longer
command the allegiance of a majority of Iowans. No great
amount of political sagacity was required to perceive that the
confused party situation had created a splendid opportunity
for the formation of a new political organization to oppose
the Democracy, which had dominated state politics since ter-
ritorial days. The materials were readily available: orphaned
Whigs, alienated Democrats, free-soilers, and a host of politi-
cal dissidents of every kind. All that was needed was political
leadership capable of welding those diverse elements into an
opposition party. Such leadership was quickly forthcoming,
and the result was the formation of the Know Nothing party
in Iowa—fundamentally a response of politicians to political
opportunity of the first order. ^ ^
Granted that there was plenty of room for a new po-
litical organization in Iowa in 1854, why should eager
politicians have seen their brightest chances for success in the
creation of a nativistic organization? Grimes, after all, had
been elected governor in August after a campaign in which
he had concentrated on opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska
bill—and in which nativism had been at most a distinctly
minor issue. Would it not have made far more sense under
the circumstances to have worked for the creation of a party
opposed to the extension of slavery? Since the men involved
in launching the Know Nothing organization in Iowa were,
on the whole, antislavery men, this alternative was undoubt-
edly considered—and rejected. The decision probably rested
upon several considerations.
First, there was good reason in late 1854 to question both
the relevance and the potential durability of a party devoted
primarily to the slavery issue. Earlier that year opposition to
the Kansas-Nebraska bill had been good politics. But once
the bill became law and it became apparent that there was lit-
15. State Know Nothing leaders included William Penn Clarke of Iowa
City, James Thorington of Davenport, William H. Tuthill of Tipton, and
William Loughridge of Mahaska County. Newspaper editors supportive of
the cause included James B. Howell (Keokuk Gate City), William M. Stone
(Knoxville Journal), Alfred Sanders (Davenport Gazette), John Mahin
(Muscatine Journal), Nathaniel M. Hubbard (Linn County Register [Marion]),
and Wells Spicer (Tipton Advertiser).
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tie prospect of repealing it, much of the excitement it had
generated began to evaporate.^^ For the moment, there was
no way of foreseeing the violence in Kansas that a few
months later would again make the slavery-extension issue
the focal point of Iowa politics. In late 1854 and early 1855,
therefore, it made good sense to doubt that a "Republican"
party could win major elections in the Hawkeye state.
For politicians whose chief concern was success, the
Know Nothing party had considerably more to recommend it.
It was potentially national rather than sectional, and seemed
to be concerned about the permanence of the Union. By sub-
ordinating the slavery issue, it might draw support from
nearly all segments of the political spectrum. Furthermore,
unlike the Republican party, the fledgling Know Nothing
organization had already successfully tested its political
wings. Its rapid development in the East had been almost
unbelievable, and it emerged from the various state and local
elections of 1854 with an amazing record of success. Under
the circumstances, Iowa politicians can scarcely be blamed for
concluding that Know Nothingism might well be the wave of
the future. If nativistic appeals to the electorate could achieve
such results in eastern states, why not in Iowa as well?
The mushroom growth of the Know Nothing order in
Iowa during the early months of its existence suggests that
these expectations were not altogether unfounded. Party
organizers expected mass support—and they got it. But not
all Iowans who flocked to this proscriptive order did so for
the same reasons. For some—though probably a relative
few—it was an opportunity to express genuine ethnic and
religious tensions that may have been smoldering for some
time. Others were drawn by curiosity, or by the attractions of
secrecy and ritual. For many disgusted Whigs and Democrats,
it must have been a convenient means of escaping old party
ties.
From the very beginning, but particularly during 1855
and 1856, Know Nothingism attracted those Iowans who
16. "Know Nothingism is the Only remaining formidable issue . . . ,"
Henry Clay Dean to George W. Jones, Iowa City, 22 January 1855, Henry
Clay Dean Collection, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.
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feared that growing sectional conflict might tear the nation
apart. As an organization, it claimed to be broadly national
and conservative—well equipped to still the waves of sec-
tional agitation and thereby save the Union. In the process,
rights and interests of certain segments of the population
would have to be sacrificed, but undoubtedly more than a
few Iowans considered this a small price to pay for union.
That kind of thinking undoubtedly accounts for, in part
at least, the strength and persistence of nativism in a number
of counties just north of the Missouri state line. Those coun-
ties were settled chiefly by southerners, and therefore by
people who were caught squarely in the middle of the
increasing sectional conflict of the 1850s. Tied by memories
and family connections to the South, some were avowedly
proslavery. Most seem to have shared an intense dislike of
both African-Americans and abolitionists. Nevertheless, they
were now residents of a free state, and as a result many of
them possessed a special sensitivity to the demands of the
North as well as the South. Wholehearted commitment to
one side or the other was often next to impossible. Conse-
quently, many did their best to straddle—or avoid—the
issues that seemed to drive a wedge between the sections.
Politically, however, that was not easily done in the mid-
1850s. Nothing could any longer be expected from the Whig
party. The Democracy could fairly be charged with having
reopened the wounds of sectional bitterness when it sup-
ported the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854. And when later the
Republican party made itself available to Iowans, it gave
every indication of wishing to fan the flames of sectional
passion rather than to extinguish them.^''
On the other hand, the Know Nothing organization,
with its emphasis on the Union and patriotism, was an ideal
political vehicle for Iowans who wished to subordinate the
sources of sectional conflict. And for ex-southerners living in
the lower tiers of counties, it was attractive in still another
sense. Catholics and foreign-born residents were conspicuous
by their absence in much of that area.^ ^ A campaign directed
17. See the Bloomfield True Flag, 1855-1856.
18. 1856 Iowa Census, 15, 19, 94, 98, 254, 261, 304, 308, 319, 321. On the
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against them would consequently involve a minimum of
political risk.
Taken together, these various attractions help to account
for the success of the Know Nothing organization in Iowa.
They also help to explain why that success was so short-
lived. Nevertheless, they do not constitute an entirely ade-
quate survey of the resources from which the Know Nothing
movement drew its strength.
First, these factors do not adequately account for the
magnitude of support the party received. More particularly,
all of them presuppose that the decision to support the Know
Nothings was a deliberate, rational response to consciously
identifiable problems or opportunities, many of which were
only remotely related to genuine concern over alien threats to
American institutions. Presumably, then, most Iowa Know
Nothings were deliberately willing to make scapegoats of
Catholics and the foreign-born in order to achieve social and
political objectives of various kinds.
Undoubtedly deliberate scapegoating was often involved.
But it is nearly impossible to read through the literature of
the Know Nothing movement in Iowa without becoming im-
pressed by the emotional intensity and sincerity of many who
professed their faith in proscription. Certainly a good many
Iowans during the years 1854-1856 were genuinely fearful of
alien influence in American life. What is considerably less
certain is why they should have been so fearful. Concrete
religious and ethnic tensions were relatively weak in Iowa.
Furthermore, Know Nothing rhetoric in Iowa seldom con-
cerned itself with the local scene, but rather repeated the
same vague, general, and often unsubstantiated charges
against immigrants and Catholics that were printed ad nau-
seam in Know Nothing publications in the East. That rhetoric
may have kept in touch with reality, but certainly there was
no firm grasp involved. The best it could manage was sour
complaint about alleged shortcomings in American society.
Never did it provide any kind of realistic program for the
elimination of those shortcomings or for the solution of those
Catholic Church in southern Iowa, see N. Howe Parker, Iowa As It Is in
1855 (Chicago, 1855), 257-58.
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problems that apparently so agitated the Know Nothing
mind.
Yet somehow that rhetoric, despite its inherent irrational-
ity and an obvious air of fantasy, appealed to more than a few
Iowans in the mid-1850s, perhaps because nativism was for
many a not altogether self-conscious response to the apparent
disruption of American society. Those were years of unrest
and confusion, of anxiety and disorder. Disturbing economic,
social, and political changes occurred in such rapid-fire order
that many citizens must have found themselves bewildered—
and frustrated—as they sought to acquire a sense of meaning
and direction in their lives. Seemingly the very foundations of
the nation were shaking. Somehow something had gone
wrong with the promise of American life. The causes of dis-
ruption and confusion were complex and not easily compre-
hensible. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Americans,
unable or unwilling to discover the real sources of their frus-
tration, sought out instead simple causes and simple solutions.
Both were readily available, and both were persuasively articu-
lated in Know Nothing propaganda.
The threatened disintegration of American society could
be viewed as the result of an erosion of fundamental Ameri-
can values. Know Nothing publicist Thomas R. Whitney put
it in these words:
Religion, patriotism, and morality have been the founda-
tion-stones of our success as a nation, and our happiness and
prosperity as a people. These foundation-stones were laid
upon the rock of a stern Protestant faith, and their fruits have
been all that our institutions promised—civil and religious lib-
erty. So long as the foundation and sub-structure remained
firm and unshaken, so long we retained the assurance of a
permanent government, and the guarantee of continued
freedom.
But the foundation is being removed, and the rock upon
which it was laid is in danger of being undermined. Imported
infidelity is supplanting the religion of our fathers. It rears its
unabashed visage, and boldly demands the abolition of all
laws for the observance of the Sabbath. Patriotism is giving
way to fanaticism and party spirit. A sectional war of opinion
is now raging, which demands the disruption of our nation—
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the North from the South. The moral element of our success is
diluted by the influence of imported vices and irreligion—and
Romanism already begins to assert her supremacy over the
Protestant basis of the Republic.
While these corroding changes are going on, it is impos-
sible to hope that another quarter of a century will find our
Union of States in existence, or our boasted and cherished
institutions still shedding their invigorating and cheering
example upon the nations of the earth.''
The solution to the problem was equally simple—a reaf-
firmation of and rededication to those principles that consti-
tuted the distinctive bases of American culture. In a culturally
pluralistic nation, however, this presented some problems;
hence the need (consistently reflected in Know Nothing liter-
ature) to define what was American and what was un-Ameri-
can, and a corresponding insistence on the necessity for
homogeneity in American culture.
THIS EXPLANATION of the attractions of Know Noth-
ingism for many Iowans is admittedly impressionistic; yet it
has much to recommend it. It renders Know Nothing rhetoric
comprehensible; it provides an explanation for how a multi-
tude of Iowans may have been seized by a wholly unwar-
ranted and unreasonable fear of immigrants and Catholics.
But it also helps account for the coincidence of nativism, tem-
perance, and antislavery in the minds of so many Iowans in
the mid-1850s. Each of those reform movements was an
attempt to reaffirm American traditions and to homogenize
American institutions. It seems likely, therefore, that temper-
ance advocates, for instance, were drawn to Know Noth-
ingism not so much because it was an opportunity to strike at
the opponents of temperance. Rather, the same kind of per-
sonality that would be attracted to temperance might often,
in the context of those times, be similarly attracted to Know
Nothingism. Thus, a general feeling of frustration generated
by bewildering societal change was the prime factor in rally-
19. Thomas R. Whitney, A Defence of the American Policy (New York,
1856), 325-26.
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ing masses of Iowans around the standard of Know Nothing-
ism—once, of course, that standard had been raised by
opportunistic politicians.
Whatever the nature of the Know Nothing appeal, its
hold on the political allegiance of Iowans was in most cases
strikingly brief. Created out of the wreckage of older parties,
the Know Nothing movement was an impossible combination
of frustration and opportunism. Reasonable concern over
alien influences in American life was a perfectly legitimate
response to the events of the early 1850s. But the creation of
a secret political organization to deal with those influences
betrayed an utter inability to relate means to ends. Never did
the party leadership propose a nativistic platform or program
that got much more specific than an insistence that "Ameri-
cans should rule America." Possibly nothing more could be
expected of an organization that attracted its adherents for
such a variety of reasons. The inevitable result was a party
with little potential for either constructive achievement or
permanence.
Yet, in the final analysis, the failure of Know Nothingism
in Iowa—as elsewhere—was more than a case of congenital
malformation. Doubtless the party would not have survived
for long under any circumstances, but the development in
1855 and 1856 of a groundswell of concern over the slavery
question hastened its death. The formation of the Republican
party in Iowa created a competitor that spoke far more
appealingly to the concrete concerns of Iowans than did the
Know Nothings. As fear of alien influence gave way to fear
of the "slave power," Know Nothingism was swallowed up in
Republicanism.

